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Abstract—Vehicular communication plays a key role in near-future automotive transport, promising features such as increased traffic
safety and wireless software updates. However, vehicular communication can expose drivers’ locations and thus poses privacy risks.
Many schemes have been proposed to protect privacy in vehicular communication, and their effectiveness is usually evaluated with
privacy metrics. However, to the best of our knowledge, (1) different privacy metrics have never been compared to each other, and (2) it
is unknown how strong the metrics are. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the strength of 41 privacy metrics in terms of four novel
criteria: Privacy metrics should be monotonic, i.e., indicate decreasing privacy for increasing adversary strength; their values should be
spread evenly over a large value range to support within-scenario comparability; and they should share a large portion of their value
range between traffic conditions to support between-scenario comparability. We evaluate all four criteria on real and synthetic traffic
with state-of-the-art adversary models and create a ranking of privacy metrics. Our results indicate that no single metric dominates
across all criteria and traffic conditions. We therefore recommend to use metrics suites, i.e., combinations of privacy metrics, when
evaluating new privacy-enhancing technologies.
Index Terms—Privacy metrics, vehicular communications, vehicular networks, privacy, monotonicity, privacy-enhancing technologies.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
V EHICULAR communication technologies allow vehiclesto communicate with other vehicles and infrastruc-
ture nodes to enable features such as intersection collision
avoidance and cooperative adaptive cruise control. To real-
ize these features, vehicles transmit sensitive data – often
without encryption – for example their location, speed,
and heading. This information can be used by anybody
within wireless transmission range to track vehicles and
their drivers on a large scale, which raises privacy con-
cerns [8]. These privacy issues are well recognized, and
many approaches have been proposed to protect privacy.
For example, vehicles are often assumed to have a pool of
pseudonyms in addition to a long-term identifier, and differ-
ent schemes have been proposed to change pseudonyms in
a privacy-preserving way without compromising safety and
accountability [30]. Privacy metrics quantify how effectively
these schemes protect privacy.
Because privacy is difficult to quantify, privacy metrics
focus on quantities that are related to privacy, for example
the number of vehicles that an adversary cannot distinguish
or the probability that an adversary can track a vehicle
successfully. Many such metrics have been proposed, and
researchers usually select one or two metrics to evaluate a
new scheme.
However, there is a lack of research into the metrics
themselves. In particular, we are not aware of research that
compares privacy metrics or analyzes how strong privacy
metrics are. Strong privacy metrics are important to ensure
an accurate and consistent measurement of privacy, which
is essential to evaluate new privacy protection schemes.
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Contributions. In this paper, we make two contributions
to research on privacy in vehicular networks.
First, we contribute to the methodological foundations
of privacy measurement by proposing a method to evaluate
the strength of privacy metrics using four novel criteria:
• Monotonicity requires that metrics show decreasing
privacy with increasing adversary strength. This pre-
vents misjudging the effectiveness of new privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs).
• Extent requires that metric values are spread over a
large value range, and evenness requires that metric
values are distributed uniformly.
• Together, extent and evenness support fine-grained
privacy analysis within a scenario, e.g., between vehi-
cles, over time, and between parts of a city, as well as
visualization of privacy levels.
• Shared value range requires that metric values share a
common value range when applied in different traf-
fic conditions. This allows for comparisons between
scenarios.
Second, we evaluate the strength of 41 privacy metrics
for vehicular networks, rank the metrics according to their
scores in the four criteria, and make specific recommenda-
tions for the use of privacy metrics in vehicular networks.
In particular, our key findings and recommendations are:
• No single metric excels in all four criteria, and
the strength of many metrics varies between traffic
conditions. We therefore recommend to always use
metrics suites that combine the strengths of different
metrics.
• There are significant weaknesses in some metrics that
have been used to evaluate pseudonym-changing
schemes in the past, for example the mean track-
ing duration, time/distance to confusion, and maximum
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tracking time. We therefore recommend to use these
metrics with caution, if at all.
Our contributions advance the state of the art in privacy
measurement and are of particular use to researchers who
design privacy protections for vehicular networks and use
privacy metrics to evaluate their systems.
2 RELATED WORK
In this paper, we draw on related work on privacy and pri-
vacy metrics in vehicular communications, privacy metrics
in other fields, and research on evaluating the strength of
privacy metrics.
2.1 Privacy Metrics for Vehicular Networks
In the past 15 years, many different privacy metrics
have been proposed to evaluate the effectiveness of new
PETs [28]. In the vehicular networking context, privacy
metrics have been used, for example, to evaluate new
pseudonym-changing strategies. These strategies determine
how and how often vehicles change their public broadcast
identifiers to reduce the likelihood that an adversary can
track them. Proposed strategies include silent periods [19],
pseudonym swapping [9], and mix zones [12], and in each
case the privacy provided by each strategy was evaluated
with a privacy metric: maximum tracking time [19], entropy
[9], and the adversary’s success rate [12], respectively.
Despite the large variety of privacy metrics, there is no
consensus in the community as to which privacy metrics
should be used [27]. For example, Wasef and Shen [29] use
anonymity set size to quantify location privacy, whereas
Eckhoff et al. [9] use entropy to offset the weaknesses of
anonymity set size. Shokri et al. [21] argue that individual
metrics are insufficient to quantify location privacy and
combine confidence intervals, entropy, and incorrectness.
Many other privacy metrics have been used, including cu-
mulative entropy [12] and the mean time to confusion [14].
Although some of these papers argue for or against certain
privacy metrics, they do not evaluate the existing privacy
metrics in a uniform scenario and against a formal set of
criteria.
In this paper, we evaluate all 14 metrics that, to the
best of our knowledge, have already been used in vehic-
ular communications (see Table 2 in the next section). In
addition, we evaluate 21 metrics from the wider privacy
literature. These metrics have not been used in vehicular
communications before, but they can be calculated because
their computations use data that is available in vehicular
communications scenarios. We also evaluate variations of
6 metrics, either to offset their weaknesses, for example
normalized versions of the hiding property and user-specified
innocence, or to explore alternate definitions, for example a
version of the maximum tracking time that is based on the
adversary’s success rate instead of the anonymity set size.
Our work in this paper contributes to finding a set of
consensus metrics by presenting a comprehensive evalua-
tion and ranking of a large number of privacy metrics.
2.2 Criteria for Privacy Metrics
Many authors have proposed criteria that good privacy
metrics should fulfill. For example, they should be un-
derstandable and indicate the adversary’s chances of suc-
cess [1]; they should show both the level of privacy and the
potential for privacy violations [2]; they should integrate
accuracy, uncertainty, and correctness as three components
of the adversary’s success [21]; and they should quantify the
amount of resources an adversary needs to succeed [22].
These criteria can serve as a checklist of what a privacy
metric should fulfill. However, they are not suitable to
evaluate how well a privacy metric addresses each criterion,
especially when comparing privacy metrics to each other. To
address this issue, in previous work we have proposed the
criterion of monotonicity to evaluate the strength of privacy
metrics [25], [26].
In this paper, we propose three novel criteria in addition
to monotonicity to evaluate the strength of privacy metrics
for vehicular networks.
2.3 Evaluation of Privacy Metrics
When evaluating new PETs, it is important to select strong
privacy metrics because weak privacy metrics may overes-
timate privacy and result in real-world privacy violations.
However, despite the large number of privacy metrics and
the existence of criteria for privacy metrics, we are not aware
of systematic efforts to evaluate the strength of privacy met-
rics for vehicular communications. The most closely related
work in this respect is Murdoch’s evaluation of metrics for
anonymous communication [16].
In our own previous work, we presented a method for
the evaluation of privacy metrics in genomic privacy [25]
and a preliminary adaptation of this method to vehicular
privacy [26]. Our initial method was based on the idea
that privacy metrics should be monotonic, and that we
can systematically evaluate their monotonicity using appro-
priately defined models for user and adversary behavior.
In this paper, we define these user and adversary models
for vehicular communications, expand the set of studied
metrics to include metrics that are relevant for vehicular
communications, and introduce three new criteria for metric
strength: extent, evenness, and shared value range.
We thus close the gap in knowledge about the strength
of privacy metrics for vehicular networks by systematically
evaluating the strength of 41 privacy metrics based on four
formal criteria.
2.4 Privacy Visualization
The visualization of privacy can help privacy engineers
design new privacy-enhancing technologies. For example,
Reeder et al. [18] visualize privacy policies in an Expandable
Grid and show that this interface can help privacy experts
make decisions. In vehicular networks, privacy metrics are
naturally associated with the locations of vehicles and can
be visualized as a map overlay. However, the use of such
visualizations of location privacy has not been investigated.
Compared with existing work, we evaluate the conditions
privacy metrics need to satisfy to produce good visualiza-
tions and briefly explore possible uses for such visualiza-
tions.
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Fig. 1. Methodology to evaluate the strength of privacy metrics. (1) User behavior and adversary behavior are combined into scenarios. (2) Privacy
metrics are applied to the scenarios. (3) The strength of privacy metrics in each scenario is evaluated with four strength indicators: monotonicity,
extent of spread, evenness of spread, and shared value range.
3 METHODOLOGY
Our goal is to evaluate the strength of privacy metrics for
vehicular networks. To do this, we adapt the method we first
introduced for genomic privacy [25] to vehicular network
privacy and introduce three new criteria that measure the
strength of privacy metrics.
Assumptions. Our method provides a controlled envi-
ronment to experiment with privacy metrics by abstracting
from many of the factors that affect privacy in the real world.
For example, we assume that precise and timely position
updates are available for all cars – a best-case scenario
from the adversary’s viewpoint – instead of considering
network-level packet delays or losses. This ensures that the
evaluation of metric strength is not influenced by network
communication artifacts.
In addition, we abstract from the application of privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) because a strong PET has
a similar observable effect on privacy metrics as a weak
adversary (and, conversely, a weak PET “looks” the same as
a strong adversary). In other words, the adversary’s success
and the user’s privacy are two sides of the same coin [15],
[21], and we focus on modeling the adversary’s side.
Overview. To apply our methodology (see Fig. 1), we
first define scenarios consisting of users and an adversary,
where the adversary aims to infer user behavior. Second,
we calculate the values of a range of privacy metrics in each
scenario and finally we measure the strength of each privacy
metric using four strength indicators: monotonicity, extent of
spread, evenness of spread, and shared value range. We
used open-source Python packages including NumPy [24],
SciPy [24], scikit-learn [17], scikit-gof, and mpi4py [7] to
implement our methodology.
3.1 User Behavior: Real-World Traffic Traces
We model user behavior using spatio-temporal traffic traces.
These traces of physical movement determine the character-
istics of the network traffic the adversary can observe. We
use eight sets of traffic traces, representing combinations of
real and synthetic traffic as well as inner city traffic and
highway traffic, to model realistic traffic in varied environ-
ments. Fig. 2 plots the coordinates of all vehicles at all time
steps for each of the eight traffic traces.
(a) Beijing (b) Ko¨ln (c) Luxembourg
(d) Rome (e) San Francisco (f) Shenzhen
(g) Madrid Hwy A6 (h) US Hwy 101
Fig. 2. Maps of the traffic traces used in our evaluation. Grayscale
indicates the density of traffic (black=dense). The traffic data of Beijing,
Rome, San Francisco, Shenzhen, and US Highway 101 are from real-
world vehicles. The data of Madrid, Ko¨ln, and Luxembourg are synthetic.
Note that the y axes for Madrid and US 101 are not to scale.
For inner city traffic, we use taxi traces recorded in
Rome [4], Beijing [5], and Shenzhen [5] as well as synthetic
traffic based on measurements of real traffic in Ko¨ln [23]
and Luxembourg [6]. The Ko¨ln traffic traces were generated
by the microscopic mobility simulator SUMO, based on
detailed travel and activity patterns collected by the German
Federal Statistical Office. The Luxembourg traces were also
generated by SUMO and are based on synthetic traffic
demand that combines the real population demographics,
road network, and traffic volume.
For highway traffic, we use real traffic from highway 101
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near Los Angeles [11] and synthetic traffic from highway
A6 near Madrid. The synthetic traffic is based on real-world
traffic counts and has been generated by a microscopic
vehicular mobility simulator [13]. The resulting traffic traces
represent unidirectional, free flowing highway traffic.
Because the characteristics of vehicular network graphs
can depend on the time of day and day of the week [13], we
selected different combinations of time slots and days from
the full traffic traces where possible. Table 1 summarizes the
characteristics of each dataset.
We note that scenarios with low traffic density, such as
Rome and Beijing, can be used to approximate the situation
during roll-out of a new vehicular networking technology,
when the percentage of vehicles equipped with the new
technology is still low.
3.2 Adversary Behavior
The adversary in vehicular communications is often as-
sumed to be a passive observer who aims to track vehi-
cles [9]. To evaluate the strength of privacy metrics, the
adversary model needs to (1) represent a realistic and strong
adversary, and (2) be adjustable to model adversaries of
different strengths.
Tracking algorithm. To fulfill the requirement for a
realistic and strong adversary, we implemented a state-of-
the-art tracking algorithm, the joint probabilistic data asso-
ciation filter (JPDA) (also called multiple hypothesis tracker
(MHT) with zero-scan [30]). Originally described for radar
tracking [3], JPDA has already been applied to vehicle track-
ing [10], [30]. The JPDA algorithm maintains a list of tracks,
each representing one vehicle. Whenever new observations
arrive, the tracker computes the best continuations for all
tracks, based only on positions and velocities of existing
tracks and observations. JPDA uses Kalman filtering and
can resolve non-unique associations between existing tracks
and new observations. Our implementation of JPDA follows
[3], with inspiration for the definition of the state vector
and covariance matrices taken from [10], [30]. The tracker
is subject to two kinds of noise: process noise that represents
random motion in the system between observations, and
measurement noise that represents uncertainty in measure-
ment. JPDA assumes that both kinds of noise are normally
distributed white noise with covariances Q (process noise)
and R (measurement noise).
Ordered strength levels. To fulfill the requirement for
adjustable adversary strengths, we adjusted the parameters
for the JPDA tracker. Because tracker performance strongly
depends on the values for the covariance matrices R and
Q [30], we chose nine parameter levels for each r and q,
with r = [1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 80, 100, 140] and q = 0.1r. To
evaluate monotonicity, i.e., whether privacy metrics indicate
high privacy for weak adversaries and low privacy for
strong adversaries, these adversary strength levels need to
be ordered. We illustrate this ordering in Fig. 3, which shows
box plots of the probability that the adversary can continue a
vehicle’s track correctly in six different traffic conditions. In
each plot, the boxes indicate the upper and lower quartiles
and the median (red line), summarizing all vehicles and
time steps for one adversary strength level. The plots also
show the mean values (grey squares), and lines extend to
the 5% and 95% quantiles.
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(f) Shenzhen, Monday 2pm
Fig. 3. Probability that a vehicle’s track is continued with the correct
observation, by adversary strength level. The subfigures show that an
increase in process noise weakens the adversary regardless of the
traffic condition.
Fig. 3 confirms that the nine parameter levels for r
and q result in ordered levels of adversary strength, with
1 consistently the strongest adversary level and 140 the
weakest (adversary strengths for the other traffic conditions
are ordered as well, see Appendix A).
3.3 Privacy Metrics
We study 41 privacy metrics that have been proposed in
the literature, both in the vehicular networking literature
and the wider literature on privacy measurement in other
application domains. Table 2 summarizes the metrics we
have analyzed as well as our results for metric strength (we
introduce the criteria in Section 3.4). The table also indicates
whether the metrics evaluate privacy in each time step, for
each vehicle, or both. For example, entropy generates values
both per-time and per-vehicle, the adversary’s success rate
aggregates over all vehicles, i.e., it generates one value per-
time, and the mean tracking duration aggregates over all time
steps and thus generates values per-vehicle.
Due to the large number of metrics, we will not introduce
all metrics in detail, but instead focus on the strongest
metrics, according to our analysis in Sections 4 and 5. For
equations and references for the remaining metrics, we refer
to our previous work [28]. We present the metrics grouped
by the output they measure, according to the taxonomy
we introduced in [28]. Table 3 shows the notation used
to formally describe the metrics. For clarity, we omit the
indices for time steps and vehicles except where a metric is
based on two or more time steps or aggregates over vehicles.
3.3.1 Uncertainty Metrics
Many metrics rely on the concept of the anonymity set, i.e.,
the set of vehicles V that the adversary cannot distinguish.
In our evaluation, the anonymity set consists of all vehi-
cles v to which the tracker assigns a non-zero probability.
Most uncertainty metrics use variants of the entropy of
the anonymity set [20] to quantify privacy, indicating how
uncertain the adversary is about their estimate p(x).
Re´nyi Entropy is a parameterized description of entropy.
By adjusting the parameter α, several popular variants
of entropy can be represented in terms of Re´nyi entropy,
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TABLE 1
Traffic characteristics for time/day combinations
City Day Time Length Granularity Cars Cars/km2 Type Road layout Reference
Rome Mon 1pm 2700s 15s 182 0.16 taxi city [4]
Rome Tue 5pm 2700s 15s 131 0.18 taxi city [4]
Rome Wed 10am 2700s 15s 139 0.49 taxi city [4]
Rome Fri 8am 2700s 15s 54 0.04 taxi city [4]
Madrid Mon 11am 1000s 0.5s 1597 26620 synthetic highway [13]
Madrid Tue 8am 1000s 0.5s 2215 36921 synthetic highway [13]
Ko¨ln weekday 11am 600s 1s 17980 23.3 synthetic city [23]
Luxembourg weekday 11am 900s 1s 6167 39.9 synthetic city [6]
Shenzhen Mon 2pm 1000s 1s 10359 4.61 taxi city [5]
US 101 Wed 7:50am 250s 1s 1993 135036 car highway [11]
US 101 Wed 8:05am 220s 1s 1533 69431 car highway [11]
US 101 Wed 8:20am 120s 1s 1298 56656 car highway [11]
Beijing Mon 12pm 900s 15s 7972 1.27 taxi city [5]
San Francisco Tue 1am 3600s 5s 406 2.85 taxi city [5]
San Francisco Mon 8am 3600s 5s 322 2.31 taxi city [5]
for example Shannon entropy (α = 1) and collision entropy
(α = 2). Min-entropy (α = ∞) focuses on the target for
which the adversary has the highest probability and thus
indicates a lower limit on privacy. Max-entropy (α = 0)
indicates the maximum uncertainty the adversary can have
when all members of the anonymity set are equally likely
and thus represents an upper limit on privacy.
privRE ≡ Hα(X) = 1
1− αlog2
∑
x∈X
p(x)α
Because entropy is strongly influenced by low-probability
outliers, quantiles on entropy computes entropy based on
only those parts of the adversary’s estimated probability
distribution that are above a certain quantile (we used the
5% quantile in our evaluation).
Normalized Entropy uses max-entropy to normalize its
values to [0, 1], indicating the adversary’s degree of uncer-
tainty. The bounded value range is likely to make normal-
ized entropy suitable for between-scenario comparisons.
privNE ≡ H(X)
H0(X)
Conditional Entropy describes how much information
(in bits) is needed to describe the true mapping X∗ between
observations and existing tracks, conditioned on the adver-
sary’s estimate X .
privCOE ≡ H(X∗|X) = −
∑
x∈X,x∗∈X∗
p(x, x∗)log2p(x∗|x)
Inherent Privacy and conditional privacy are based on
entropy and conditional entropy, respectively. Both metrics
indicate how many yes/no questions the adversary would
have to answer correctly to describe the ground truth.
privIP ≡ 2H(X); privCP ≡ 2H(X∗|X)
3.3.2 Information Gain/Loss Metrics
Information gain/loss metrics measure how much informa-
tion the adversary gains (or how much privacy the user
loses) through the adversary’s observation.
Amount of leaked information indicates how many
vehicles v the adversary can track correctly, i.e., all cases
in which the observation with the highest probability corre-
sponds to the correct vehicle. Its values strongly depend on
the total number of vehicles in a scenario.
privALI ≡ |V |,∀v ∈ V : max p(xv) = x∗v
Mutual Information indicates the amount of informa-
tion shared between the distribution of the adversary’s
estimate X and the true mapping X∗.
privMI ≡ I(X∗;X) = H(X∗)−H(X∗|X)
Conditional Privacy Loss is based on mutual information
and measures the fraction of privacy lost through the adver-
sary’s estimate.
privCPL ≡ 1− 2−I(X∗;X)
Pearson Correlation measures the degree of linear de-
pendence between the adversary’s estimate and the ground
truth, with a lower coefficient indicating higher privacy.
privPCC ≡ cov(X
∗, X)
σX∗σX
3.3.3 Error Metrics
Error metrics measure how far the adversary’s estimate is
from the ground truth, either in terms of probabilities or in
terms of geographical distance.
Expected Distance Error measures the expected Eu-
clidean distance d(x, x∗) between the true location and the
estimated location over multiple time steps t.
privEDE ≡ 1|V |T
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V
∑
x∈X
p(xv,t)d(x, x
∗)
Incorrectness indicates the adversary’s probability of
error. It replaces the Euclidean distance with an indicator
function dˆ that yields 0 if the adversary was able to track a
vehicle correctly, and 1 if the tracking was not successful.
privINC ≡
∑
x∈X
p(x)dˆ(x, x∗)
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TABLE 2
Location privacy metrics used in our evaluation. Metrics in bold are
explained in Section 3.3. Starred metrics have previously been used in
vehicular communications. H/L: high (H) or low (L) values indicate high
privacy. Ratings for the four criteria are based on their average
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Pearson correlation X X L ++ o + +
Relative entropy X X H + – – +
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Expected distance error* X H ++ – ++ –
Expected distortion* X X H + – – –
Expected estimation error* X X L + – – –
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Time to confusion, h=3* X L o o + o
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3.3.4 Adversary’s Success Metrics
Adversary’s success metrics quantify how likely it is that
the adversary succeeds.
Privacy Breach Level indicates the posterior probability
the adversary assigns to the true vehicle, given the observa-
TABLE 3
Notation for all privacy metrics
H(· ) Entropy
I(· ; · ) Mutual information
v ∈ V Set of vehicles the adversary aims to track
T Total observation time
Xv,t Adversary’s estimated probabilities for vehicle v at time t
Yv,t Adversary’s observed data (may be obfuscated)
X∗v,t True assignment of observations to vehicles
d(x, x∗) Distance between the estimated and true location
h Threshold for entropy
l Rate of privacy decay
s Threshold for adversary’s probability
tions y from the current time step.
privPBL ≡ p(x = x∗|y)
3.3.5 Time Metrics
Time metrics are based on the time during which the adver-
sary can (or cannot) successfully track a vehicle.
Time to Confusion indicates the cumulative time during
which entropy is below a threshold h, i.e., the time during
which the adversary is not confused.
privTC ≡ Time during which H(X) < h
3.4 Criteria for Metric Strength
We use four criteria to evaluate the strength of these privacy
metrics: monotonicity, the spread of the value range in terms
of extent and evenness, and the portion of the value range
that is shared across scenarios.
3.4.1 Monotonicity
The most important requirement for privacy metrics is
monotonicity, i.e., metrics should indicate decreasing pri-
vacy values with increasing adversary strength. Non-
monotonic metrics may indicate the same privacy level for
weak and strong adversaries, or for strong and weak PETs.
The use of non-monotonic metrics can thus lead to misjudg-
ing the strength of privacy protections, and subsequently to
real-world privacy violations.
We have previously proposed an algorithm to compute
monotonicity scores [25] (adapted to vehicular networks in
Fig. 4). In brief, the algorithm uses two statistical tests for
each pair of successive adversary strength levels to deter-
mine whether the difference between mean metric values
is statistically significant and points in the expected direc-
tion (positive for higher-better metrics, negative for lower-
better metrics). Each outcome of each statistical test is then
assigned points: +1 for a statistically significant difference
in the expected direction, −1 for a statistically significant
difference in the wrong direction, −2 for a change in direc-
tion (such a peak means that strong and weak adversaries
cannot be distinguished and is thus not desirable), and−0.2
for a change that is either zero or not statistically significant
(slight penalty for metrics that have similar values for
successive adversaries). The total monotonicity score is the
addition of these point values. We normalize monotonicity
scores to [0, 1] based on the monotonicity values for all
metrics in our study.
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Input metric values for each traffic condition c and each
adversary strength ai
Output monotonicity scores mc for one privacy metric
1: tests← {Welch’s t-test, Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic}
2: foreach traffic condition c do
3: mc ← 0
4: foreach test ∈ tests do
5: prevResult← 0
6: foreach pair of succ. adv. strengths (ai, ai+1) do
7: apply test to (ai, ai+1)
8: p← statistical significance of test
9: result← value of test statistic
10: if p < 0.05 then
11: if result > 0 (< 0 for LB metrics) then
12: mc ← mc + 1
13: else if result < 0 (> 0 for LB metrics) then
14: mc ← mc − 1
15: else
16: mc ← mc − 0.2
17: end if
18: else
19: mc ← mc − 0.2
20: end if
21: if sign(result) 6= sign(prevResult) then
22: mc ← mc − 2
23: end if
24: prevResult← result
25: end for
26: end for
27: end for
28: normalize all mc to [0, 1]
29: return monotonicity scores mc
Fig. 4. Algorithm to calculate monotonicity scores. LB (lower-better)
refers to metrics where lower values indicate higher privacy.
3.4.2 Extent and Evenness of Spread
The spread of a metric’s value range indicates how suitable
a metric is to distinguish privacy levels within scenarios. A
large spread makes it easier to identify statistically signifi-
cant differences between privacy levels. This helps to judge
whether a PET works equally well in different parts of a city,
for example in areas of high or low traffic density, allows
to compare vehicles to each other, and allows to evaluate
privacy levels over time. To support these within-scenario
comparisons, the metric’s value range should spread evenly
over a large value range.
To measure the extent of the spread, we first calculate
the standard deviation σ of the normalized metric values
for all adversary strengths individually. The extent score
then corresponds to the average standard deviation over all
adversary strengths, normalized to [0, 1] based on the extent
values for all metrics in our study.
To measure the evenness of the spread, we analyze the
uniformity of metric values, i.e., how close the distribution
of values is to a uniform distribution. We use the Crame´r-
von Mises criterion, which measures the goodness of fit
between a theoretical distribution and an empirical distri-
bution, to analyze the fit between the uniform distribution
U(0, 1) and the normalized metric values for all adversary
strengths combined. Because the Crame´r-von Mises crite-
rion is influenced by the number of samples, we normalize
the criterion by the number of metric values.
3.4.3 Shared Value Range
How much of a metric’s value range is shared across traffic
conditions indicates how suitable a metric is to compare
privacy levels between different scenarios, for example with
different traffic characteristics or different road layouts. This
helps to judge whether the performance of a new PET
is independent of specific traffic patterns, that is, whether
PETs work equally well regardless of the time of day, day
of the week, or city in which they are deployed. To support
these between-scenario comparisons, metrics should not be
influenced by the number of vehicles or the size of the area.
For example, we expect that metrics that use some form of
normalization will have a large shared value range.
To formalize this criterion, we measure how much of a
metric’s value range is shared between traffic conditions. We
first calculate the global value range for each metric across
all traffic conditions and then compute the percentage of the
global value range used in each traffic condition.
3.4.4 Discussion of Criteria
Of the four criteria for metric strength we have defined in
this section, monotonicity is the most important requirement
that all metrics should satisfy. The other three criteria focus
on more specific requirements: extent and evenness are
important to compare privacy levels within a scenario, and
shared value range is important to compare privacy levels
between scenarios. Their usefulness thus depends on what
kinds of comparisons the metrics are being used for.
4 RESULTS
We have applied our methodology to all nine levels of
adversary strength in all fifteen traffic conditions, and eval-
uated 41 privacy metrics with respect to our four criteria for
metric strength.
For each criterion, we first present detailed results to
illustrate the criterion. Due to the volume of result data
(~800 GB and more than 2000 individual plots), we present
only a small subset of our results in detail. We then present
the full set of results in aggregated heat maps and show how
the strength of metrics can depend on the traffic condition.
Finally, we rank metrics by their strength for each criterion
and derive specific recommendations for metric selection in
Section 5.
4.1 Monotonicity
To illustrate our results for the monotonicity requirement,
Fig. 5 shows one metric, the anonymity set size, in four
traffic conditions. Each subfigure shows the distribution of
metric values for the nine adversary strength levels using
violin plots, and additionally indicates confidence intervals
(horizontal lines), the area between quartiles (shaded), mean
values (bold numbers), and whether higher or lower num-
bers indicate higher privacy (green line). The full set of
violin plots for all metrics and traffic conditions is included
in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 5. Anonymity set size in four traffic conditions, ordered from lowest to highest monotonicity.
The anonymity set size for US highway 101 at 8:20 am
(Fig. 5a) has the lowest monotonicity rating, caused by
changes in the wrong direction between adversary strengths
30 and 80, and by the negative peak at adversary strength
80. US highway 101 at 7:50 am (Fig. 5b) has the next
highest monotonicity rating, caused by the negative peak
at adversary strength 100. In Rome (Fig. 5c), the anonymity
set size is monotonic, but several strength levels have no
statistically significant difference (e.g., 30/40 and 80/100).
In the figure, this lack of a statistically significant difference
can be seen in the overlapping confidence intervals between
neighboring violins. San Francisco (Fig. 5d) has the highest
monotonicity rating for the adversary’s success rate because
the metric is monotonic and all strength levels are clearly
distinguishable.
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Fig. 6. Heat map for monotonicity. The colors indicate the monotonicity
score (from yellow=low to blue=high).
In Fig. 6, we use a heat map to visualize monotonicity
scores in a compact way. Each square represents one set of
results presented in detailed violin plots above, computed
according to our algorithm in Fig. 4. For example, the last
square in the third row summarizes Fig. 5a (anonymity set
size for US highway 101, 8:20am). The heat map thus sum-
marizes the results for 15 traffic conditions and 44 metrics,
i.e., 660 individual results.
The heat map shows that several metrics have high
monotonicity regardless of the traffic condition, for example
entropy and the privacy breach level. Very few metrics are non-
monotonic throughout and therefore not recommended, for
example information surprisal. The monotonicity of most
other metrics varies depending on the traffic condition. For
example, the adversary’s success rate is very strong in three
traffic conditions but only of medium strength in the other
conditions. If these metrics are selected to evaluate a new
PET, it is necessary to validate their monotonicity for the
specific scenario.
Heat maps visualize a large number of results by traffic
condition, but they do not show the overall ranking of
privacy metrics. To do this, we aggregate the heat map into
box plots, such that each row in the heat map is represented
by one box. We then sort the boxes by their mean values and
plot the 15 best metrics (we show the full plot in Appendix
C).
Fig. 7 shows that the metric with the highest monotonic-
ity score is entropy, followed by seven other metrics that are
derived from entropy. We note that several of the metrics
that have been proposed to evaluate PETs for vehicular
networks, such as the maximum tracking time, the time to
confusion, and the mean tracking duration, are not among the
strongest metrics (in fact, their average monotonicity scores
are below 0.5).
The normalized monotonicity scores of the top metrics
are higher than 0.5 in all cases, indicating that the metrics
are mostly monotonic and therefore suitable to evaluate and
compare new PETs.
A score below 0.5 is generally undesirable because it
indicates the presence of non-monotonic behavior, for ex-
ample cases where a metric indicates higher (instead of
lower) privacy for a stronger adversary. These metrics are
not suitable to evaluate the performance of PETs because
they may misjudge not only how well a new PET protects
privacy, but also how two PETs compare to each other.
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Fig. 7. Distribution of the monotonicity for the 15 best metrics across
all traffic conditions. The top-8 metrics all belong to the uncertainty
category.
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(a) Incorrectness, Rome 1pm:
extent=0.87, evenness=0.73
(b) Entropy, Luxembourg:
extent=0.28, evenness=0.20
(c) Incorrectness, US 101:
extent=0.52, evenness=0.99
(d) Entropy, Rome 1pm:
extent=0.58, evenness=0.84
(e) Mutual Information, Luxembourg:
extent=0.65, evenness=0.55
(f) Mutual Information, US 101:
extent=0.24, evenness=0.58
Fig. 8. Spread: extent vs. evenness. These plots show an overplot of 5 adversary strengths (1, 20, 40, 80, 140) with 20% transparency. All metrics
in this plot have high monotonicity, but show varying degrees of extent and evenness.
4.2 Extent and Evenness of Spread
To illustrate our requirement for spread, we plot the privacy
values as colors on city maps, such that light colors indicate
high privacy and dark colors indicate low privacy (Fig. 8).
The light/dark color sequence corresponds to the global
value range for each metric.
In the Rome (1pm) traffic condition, incorrectness (Fig. 8a)
has a large extent (0.87), which can be seen in the clear repre-
sentation of both the darkest and lightest colors, indicating
that there is non-negligible probability mass on a large range
of privacy values. The evenness is lower (0.73), which can
be seen through a lower proportion of medium browns
compared to roughly equal proportions of the darkest and
lightest colors. In contrast, entropy (Fig. 8d) has a lower
extent (0.58), which is visible in the absence of very light
colors, but a higher evenness (0.87), indicated by the clear
visibility of light, medium, and dark colors.
In Luxembourg, entropy (Fig. 8b) has both low extent and
low evenness, which can be seen in the complete absence of
light colors and a large overrepresentation of dark colors.
Mutual information (Fig. 8e) has a higher extent, indicated by
the presence of lighter colors in the center, but the evenness
is still low, again indicated by the overrepresentation of dark
colors. For this traffic condition, mutual information is thus
more suitable to visualize differences in privacy between
the dense city center and the less-dense outskirts.
For traffic on the US highway 101, incorrectness (Fig. 8c)
shows a much lower extent compared to Rome, but a very
high evenness. This highlights an interesting property of the
incorrectness metric: we find that its distribution is bimodal
for all inner-city traffic conditions, but not for the highway
traffic conditions. As a result, incorrectness is one of the few
metrics where we find a statistically significant difference
between city traffic and highway traffic (i.e., no overlap
in 95% confidence intervals for extent). Other metrics with
a similar behavior include conditional privacy loss, privacy
breach level, and mutual information (Fig. 8f).
In Fig. 9, we show the extent and evenness scores on
heat maps. Even though the extent scores are lower on
average than the evenness scores, the two heat maps show a
similar pattern of high and low scores, indicating that extent
and evenness may be correlated. We discuss correlations
between our four criteria in Section 4.5.
The heat maps show that some metrics have a low
extent in all scenarios, e.g., expected distance error and user-
centric location privacy, and some metrics have low evenness
throughout, e.g., cross entropy and user-centric location pri-
vacy. Even though the monotonicity of these metrics may be
high, their low spread in terms of extent and/or evenness
makes them less suitable to measure differences in privacy
within a scenario or to visualize privacy levels on a map.
Some metrics score highly in extent but low on evenness,
for example incorrectness and conditional privacy loss. The val-
ues of these metrics generally have a bimodal distribution.
Incorrectness, for example, has most of its probability mass
on the values 0 and 1, and very little probability mass in
between. Although these metrics can clearly separate vehi-
cles that enjoy high resp. low privacy, they are less suitable
for visualization and fine-grained analysis than metrics that
score highly on evenness, such as max-entropy.
Metrics with both high extent and high evenness, such
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Fig. 9. Heat maps for the spread (extent and evenness) of privacy metrics. The colors indicate the value of each criterion (from yellow=low to
blue=high).
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Fig. 10. Distribution of the metric’s spread for the best 15 metrics across all traffic conditions.
as max-entropy and privacy breach level, are most desirable,
because they can show within-scenario differences clearly
and can highlight how privacy levels change between areas
of low and high privacy.
Generally, metrics with a high monotonicity score do
not necessarily score highly in spread. For example, the
metric with the highest monotonicity score, entropy, only
has medium extent and evenness scores. Comparing the
ranking of metrics according to monotonicity (Fig. 7) and
extent (Fig. 10a), we find that only four metrics occur in
both top 15 lists (incorrectness, privacy breach level, anonymity
set size, and max-entropy). This indicates that in some cases it
may be necessary to trade-off monotonicity against extent.
The choice of metrics in such a situation depends on the
purpose of the evaluation. One possible choice is to find a
compromise metric with relatively high scores in both crite-
ria, e.g., privacy breach level or max-entropy, to both evaluate
the effectiveness of PETs and visualize privacy levels on a
map. Another choice is to combine the best metrics from
each criterion, i.e., entropy and incorrectness, in a metrics
suite.
Compared with the distribution of monotonicity in
Fig. 7, the boxes in Fig. 10 have wider ranges. This means
that even the metrics with the highest extent and even-
ness scores may be weak in some traffic conditions. Their
suitability for within-scenario comparisons can therefore
be condition-specific and should be validated before the
metrics are used.
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Fig. 11. Shared value range: metrics in the top row show very different value ranges (y axis), while the bottom row (normalized entropy) has a
shared value range of [0,1] across all scenarios.
4.3 Shared Value Range
Metrics that use the same value range regardless of the
traffic condition are more suitable to compare privacy lev-
els between scenarios. To illustrate this requirement for a
shared value range, Fig. 11 shows the anonymity set size and
distance to confusion in two traffic conditions each (top row)
and the normalized entropy in four traffic conditions (bottom
row). We can see that the value range for anonymity set size
depends heavily on the traffic conditions, ranging up to 80
in Rome (not shown), 120 in Shenzhen (Fig. 11a), and 800
in Beijing (Fig. 11b). For Beijing, the shared value range is
1.00 because the metric values cover the entire global value
range. Rome (0.09) and Shenzhen (0.14) indicate much lower
values for the shared value range.
A similar observation holds for the distance to confu-
sion, which ranges up to 14000 on Madrid’s A6 highway
(Fig. 11c), but only up to 800 on the US 101 highway
(Fig. 11d). This indicates that neither the anonymity set size
nor the distance to confusion are suitable for between-scenario
comparisons. In contrast, the bottom row shows the value
of normalized entropy in the same four traffic conditions as in
the top row. In each case, the metric is valued between 0 and
1, indicating that normalized entropy supports comparisons
between traffic conditions.
Fig. 12 summarizes our results for the shared value range
in a heat map. Most metrics with a low shared value range
across traffic conditions, e.g., amount of leaked information,
expected estimation error, and hiding property, are calculated
from absolute values such as the number of vehicles, dis-
tance, and time, which do not have a natural upper limit.
These metrics vary significantly between different scenarios,
resulting in a small shared value range. Metrics that have
a large shared value range across traffic conditions, e.g.,
conditional privacy loss, incorrectness, and normalized entropy,
use fractions or ratios to calculate their values. As a result,
their value ranges have defined upper and lower limits and
a larger portion of it is shared across traffic conditions.
Fig. 13 ranks the 15 metrics that score highest on shared
value range. We note that some metrics with a high shared
value range score very low on monotonicity, e.g., increase in
adversary belief and information surprisal. Despite their shared
value range, these metrics cannot be recommended to com-
pare privacy between scenarios because they may misjudge
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Fig. 12. Heat maps for the shared value range of privacy metrics. The
colors indicate the size of the shared value range (from yellow=low to
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the strength of the adversary or PET in the scenario.
Eight of the metrics in Fig. 13 also occur in the list of top
metrics for monotonicity, e.g., incorrectness and normalized
entropy. These metrics can be recommended for between-
scenario comparisons.
4.4 Influence of Parameter Settings
We studied nine metrics that are configurable with a param-
eter: (normalized) hiding property, (normalized) user-specified
innocence, time/distance to (first) confusion, and user-centric
location privacy. Our experiments show that the metric val-
ues depend on the parameter setting in each case, i.e., the
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Fig. 13. Distribution of the shared value range for the best 15 metrics
across all traffic conditions.
privacy level indicated by metrics depends on the param-
eter value. In this section, we analyze whether the metric
strength in terms of monotonicity, extent and evenness of
spread, and shared value range depends on the parameter
setting as well.
(Normalized) hiding property and (normalized) user-specified
innocence use a threshold s for the adversary’s probability.
We find that the value of s does not influence the strength
of the metrics (the full results are shown in the heat maps in
Appendix D). We therefore discuss only a single parameter
level, s = 0.5, in the paper.
Time/distance to (first) confusion use a threshold h on
the adversary’s uncertainty (i.e., entropy). We find that the
strengths of time/distance to first confusion are not influenced
by the value of h, and therefore we discuss only h = 0.1
for these metrics. In contrast, the strengths of time/distance to
confusion vary depending on the parameter setting. Specif-
ically, the spread (both extent and evenness) and shared
value range improve with higher parameter values, while
monotonicity improves with lower parameter values. We
therefore discuss h = 0.1 as well as h = 3 in the paper.
User-centric location privacy uses the parameter l to ex-
press the rate of privacy decay over time. We find that
the evenness of the spread is not influenced by l, whereas
monotonicity and the extent of the spread improve with
lower parameters, and the shared value range improves
with higher values of l. We therefore discuss l = 0.1 and
l = 2 in the paper.
4.5 Correlation Between Criteria
To show that all four of our criteria are necessary to measure
the strength of privacy metrics, we evaluate whether they
are independent or correlated with each other.
Fig. 14 shows two of the pairwise correlations between
the four criteria in scatter plots (we show the remaining
pairwise correlations in Appendix B). The plots show one
small blue circle for each combination of metric and traffic
condition. Large orange circles indicate the average value
for each metric. To show how individual metrics behave
in different traffic conditions, we highlight entropy with red
squares and incorrectness with blue triangles.
It is clear from Fig. 14a that extent and shared value
range are not correlated (r = 0.15), and similar results
hold for most of the other correlations. This indicates that
all criteria are necessary to evaluate the strength of privacy
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Fig. 14. Correlation between criteria. Pearson correlation coefficient r =
0.60 for evenness/extent, r < 0.16 for all others.
metrics because they evaluate independent aspects of the
behavior of privacy metrics.
The only exception is the correlation between extent and
evenness (r = 0.60, Fig. 14b), i.e., between two criteria
that measure the spread of metric values. Although the
correlation coefficient of 0.60 indicates a positive correlation,
the correlation is not very high. As a result, there are several
cases where extent and evenness diverge and thus it is
beneficial to evaluate both aspects of a metric’s spread. For
example, while the mean values of most metrics (orange
circles) in Fig. 14b follow the linear correlation, many values
for incorrectness (blue triangles) show much higher extent
than would be expected, while other metrics show much
lower extent than expected, e.g., expected distance error and
increase in adversary belief (the two bottom-right orange
circles).
5 DISCUSSION
We have discussed and ranked 41 privacy metrics according
to four criteria: monotonicity, extent, evenness, and shared
value range. To make the choice of privacy metrics easier,
we now aggregate the four criteria into a single ranking.
We calculate the overall score for each metric by adding up
the normalized values for each criterion. Fig. 15 shows that
all metrics fall short of the maximum score of 4: the metric
with the best mean value across all scenarios is incorrectness
(3.29), and the best strength score in a single traffic condition
is 3.76 (privacy breach level, Rome 10am).
To compare whether the differences in overall metric
scores are statistically significant, Fig. 15 shows notched box
plots. The notches depend on the inter-quartile range (IQR)
and extend to 1.58 ∗ IQR/√n, indicating a roughly 95%
confidence interval for the median. We note that the notches
for several metrics are overlapping, indicating that there is
no statistically significant difference between the medians.
In particular, the confidence interval for the first metric
incorrectness overlaps with the confidence intervals of seven
other metrics (privacy breach level down to collision entropy,
with the exception of normalized entropy, Pearson correlation,
and max-entropy). As a result, we cannot decide on a clear
“winner” metric. In addition, the individual rankings for
the four criteria show that there is no single metric that
outperforms the others in all criteria and for all traffic
conditions.
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5.1 Weak Metrics
We note that some of the metrics that have been proposed
specifically for use in vehicular networks score low on
monotonicity and are in the bottom half of our overall metric
ranking. These metrics include the mean tracking duration,
time/distance to confusion, and maximum tracking time. Even
though these metrics may make sense intuitively, they can
make PETs appear stronger than they are (low monotonic-
ity) or skew comparisons between scenarios (low shared
value range). Therefore we recommend to replace these
metrics with other metrics that are stronger in vehicular
network scenarios.
5.2 Visualization to Support PET Design
Our visualization of privacy metrics on city maps (Fig. 8)
showed that privacy often depends on the road layout and
traffic density in a city. For example, privacy levels were
often higher in the city center, and decreased towards the
outskirts of a city. A possible consequence for the design
of PETs is that it may make sense to apply one PET in
city centers with dense traffic, and choose another PET
for outskirts with less dense traffic, or to adjust parameter
settings to provide adequate privacy in all areas.
Visualizing privacy levels on a map can support these
design decisions because it highlights in which areas differ-
ent PETs are most effective. Metrics that have high extent
and evenness and generate per-time and per-vehicle values,
e.g., max-entropy or privacy breach level, are suitable to create
such visualizations.
5.3 Metrics Suites
Even the best metrics in our experiments do not perform
well in all traffic conditions, as indicated in our box plots
and heat maps. One solution to this problem is to validate
all metrics before applying them to new traffic conditions.
Depending on the traffic data, this may take a long time and
may not always be feasible.
A better solution is therefore to combine several metrics
into a metrics suite, i.e., to always work with multiple
metrics. This approach can offset weaknesses in metrics,
especially if the metrics in the suite are chosen carefully.
We recommend to consider three aspects when choosing a
metrics suite:
• Only use metrics with a high monotonicity score
• Include metrics from different categories, e.g., un-
certainty, information gain/loss, and error (see Sec-
tion 3.3 and Table 2)
• Include metrics that are particularly strong for
within-scenario comparisons as well as metrics that
are strong for between-scenario comparisons.
An example metrics suite could thus consist of normalized
entropy (uncertainty, high shared value range), conditional
privacy loss (information gain/loss, high extent), incorrectness
(error, high extent and shared value range), privacy breach
level (adversary’s success probability, high extent and shared
value range, good evenness), and time to confusion with
h = 0.1 (time, high evenness). This metrics suite has an
average monotonicity score of 0.86.
To allow for the construction of metrics suites that meet
custom requirements, we publish our dataset with detailed
results for all four criteria in the supplementary material.
6 CONCLUSION
We have introduced four novel criteria to evaluate the
strength of privacy metrics: monotonicity, extent, evenness,
and shared value range. These criteria measure the con-
sistency of privacy metrics and their suitability for within-
scenario and between-scenario comparisons of privacy lev-
els. In extensive experiments, we have applied these criteria
to 41 privacy metrics in fifteen traffic conditions. Our results
allowed us to reason about the strength of privacy metrics
and generate an overall ranking of privacy metrics.
Our key findings are that (1) several existing metrics
have low monotonicity scores, i.e., they can misjudge the
strength of new privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), (2)
no single metric dominates across all criteria and traffic con-
ditions, and (3) visualization can highlight where privacy
depends on road layout and can thus support the design of
PETs.
Based on these findings, we recommend to always use
metrics suites when evaluating new PETs, i.e., to combine
several privacy metrics that have high monotonicity scores,
measure different outputs, and are strong for either within-
scenario or between-scenario comparisons.
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